Artifacts, Series, Solutions

Tybjerg, Casper

Published in:
A History of Cinema Without Names

Publication date:
2016

Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Casper Tybjerg, Københavns Universitet

Artifacts, Series, and Solutions

The earliest mention of the idea of a film history without names that I have been able to find dates back to the beginning of the 1980s and occurs in an essay by David Bordwell. I am going to begin by going back to this early invocation of the phrase "Film History without Names" and point out the potential pitfalls I think it reveals for a project flying that banner. Then I would like to present art historian George Kubler's concept of *series* and discuss whether it affords a way of structuring a film history without names in a way that does not become overly deterministic. André Gaudreault has developed his concept of "*séries culturelles*" independently from Kubler, and it has a rather different sense. I will briefly discuss these differences in the final part of my paper, pointing out some of the drawbacks of Kubler's approach.

Wölfflin and the Problems of Anonymous Film History

David Bordwell's essay, entitled "Textual Analysis, Etc.," is a pointed critique of Metz's *grand syntagmatique*. As an alternative to it, Bordwell offers the detailed study of a large sample of ordinary films, the project that would become *The Classical Hollywood Cinema* a few years later. On the basis of this analysis, he hopes to reconstruct historical norms of cinematic style. He writes: "You may object that a construction of historical norms of cinematic representation could become an autonomous history of style, a 'film history without names' close to Heinrich Wölfflin's conception of art history."[1] Here, then, Bordwell suggests that writing a "film history without names" would be an exercise in formalism so extreme that no right-thinking person (including himself) would indulge in it, and to describe his project in such terms would be a caricature. Interestingly, the reference attached to Bordwell's mention of a "film history without names" is not to any of Wölfflin's works, but to Arnold Hauser's *The Philosophy of Art History* from 1958. Hauser places his entire discussion of not just Wölfflin, but most of academic art history under the heading "Art History without Names"; the phrase appears at the top of every right-hand page for more than a third of his book.[2]

While Heinrich Wölfflin did use the phrase "'Kunstgeschichte ohne Namen'" in the 1915 preface to the first edition of *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, we find that it appears as a throwaway remark, put in quotation marks by Wölfflin himself.[3] Moreover, Wölfflin left the original preface out of the subsequent editions of the book, possibly because of the hostility provoked by the phrase "art history without names." Nor is it included with the English translation, *Principles of Art History*, first published in 1932.[4] What Wölfflin seems to have had in mind would be some kind of morphological atlas of visual devices, showing their development through masses of illustrations. Such a work, presumably, would document the developmental trajectories of the visual arts. He speaks of "developments in the drawing of figures, the drawing of cloth, the drawing of trees."[5] These

developments must be described, mapped, illustrated; and Wölfflin appears confident that they will follow a law-like progression from linear to painterly, from tectonic to architectonic, etc. This is a highly ambitious project, and, as Rens Bod has pointed out in his recent history of the humanities, one which bears a certain resemblance to structuralism.[6]

While Wölfflin retreated from the concept of "art history without names," he remained dismissive of those critical of his attempts to discover general laws of [art-]historical development. In the preface to the sixth German edition, dated 1922, which also introduces the English translation, he mockingly commented: "The objection that, by accepting a development of imagination determined by law, the significance of the artistic personality is destroyed, is puerile."[7] To the extent, however, that any Wölfflinian approach seeks – under the guise of scientific rigor – to impose models defined by their symmetrical elegance on the messiness of history, Arnold Hauser's objections remain relevant.

According to Hauser, the idea of "immanent laws" determining the development of art lies at the base of Wölfflin's theory. Hauser writes:

> *Thus this "art history without names" makes the basic theoretical assumption that the history of "seeing" develops according to an inner logic, according to immanent laws of its own, independently of external influences, which latter are taken to include not merely the social environment, but also the individual psychic constitution of the artist.*[8]

The consequence, Hauser explains, is that historical agency is thereby invested in something similar to the world-spirit of Hegel's philosophy. Hauser writes:

> *The particular is explained as a mere effulgence of a higher power, of a stronger, purer light. Wölfflin's "anonymous art history" is in a way just a variant of this emanistic doctrine, which makes concrete history a reflection of a realization or an articulation of a universal metaphysical principle, of an other-worldly idea, or of a supernatural power.*[9]

Almost thirty-five years after his "Textual Analysis, Etc.," Bordwell continues to share Hauser's strong misgivings about this aspect of the art-historical tradition. In 2015, Bordwell has published an article about Wölfflin and what the study of film style can learn from his work. Here, Bordwell notes how stylistic categories like "planimetric" can help call attention to stylistic details that might otherwise have gone overlooked; Wölfflin's work has left "a legacy of midrange concepts that help specify and analyze pictorial traditions in moviemaking."[10] Bordwell remains critical of the idea of laws of historical development: "He [Wölfflin] seeks laws governing the course of art history. Because these laws transcend the concrete choices made by individual artists, he seeks large-scale causes propelling them. [...] These and other of his claims seem to me implausible."[11]

I share this view. I think that it is important to remember, in the context of a research project seeking to explore the possibilities of a Film History Without Names, that such a concept (at least for some of our colleagues) will be suggestive of such Zeitgeist-y approaches. This makes it imperative to keep in mind and to reassert that the films we deal with are artworks or artifacts: they are the products of purposeful human activity. They are not the manifestation of impersonal historical forces, stages in the unfolding of some inner essence.

The art historian David Summers has made this point with particular clarity. Summers' massive book *Real Spaces* is an attempt to write a truly global art history, one that attempts to rethink the assumptions of Western art history, which has tended to take the virtual spaces we see in representational art as paradigmatic of art in general; but Summers suggests we pay more attention to the real spaces where art objects are present. Summers writes of *facture*, that before anything else, every artifact is "a record of its own having been made."[12] It is worth emphasizing here that a key dimension of what Summers is trying to do is to broaden the purview of art history to encompass artistic traditions where the artists are without names – at least names known to us. That does not mean they were without purposes. Summers writes:

> *Whatever aesthetic interest they might have, artifacts make human purposes present to us. For those who first fashion them, artifacts make purposes present in the sense that they make these purposes realizable by themselves and others. The stone axe makes tasks involving chopping possible, the shrine makes the rites of worship possible. For those of us who*

> *come later, the work is still present, but the shaping purpose is often no longer evident together with it. To one degree or another, the work has become the husk or index of a purpose.*[13]

The artifacts themselves, in Summers' view, can help us discern the purposes of the artifacts' makers.
To Bordwell, the purpose animating film-makers is often to find solutions to artistic problems. He has taken this problem-solution model for the understanding of artworks from the work of art historian E. H. Gombrich.

> *More plausible explanatory frameworks have been proposed by another pictorial poetician, E. H. Gombrich. While Wölfflin leans toward methodological holism, Gombrich posits formal development as explicable largely through methodological individualism. "The artist is always faced with the problem: 'What is there for me to do?'"*[14]

In the seminal *Art and Illusion* from 1960, Gombrich presented the idea that artists look for solutions to problems their subjects, materials, or traditions present them with and that the artists' choices can be explained in this way.[15] This went directly against the influential work of Wölfflin's contemporary Alois Riegl and his idea that art was decisively shaped by a *Kunstwollen*, a nebulous will-to-form shared by all artists of a particular epoch. Bordwell is in full agreement with Gombrich's methodological individualism.
The development of Bordwell's problem-solution model has been carefully traced in a very useful and important article by Colin Burnett that examines the influence of art history on the development of the study of style in film studies.[16] In that article, Burnett notes: "Significantly, cine-stylisticians can trace their conceptions of 'classical' and 'baroque' forms to Wölfflin's scholarship."[17] Burnett mentions the concepts of "classical Hollywood cinema" and "neo-baroque Hollywood," concluding: "These formulations attest to the continued influence of Wölfflin's concepts even as his cyclical philosophy of history has largely been rebuked."[18] Burnett's remarks suggest that film scholars have seen a need for a conceptual framework that could be used to describe a set of wider stylistic constraints on the problems and solutions available to filmmakers at a given historical moment, and particularly, a framework that changes over time. Wölfflin, according to this line of thinking, was on to something when he famously concluded the 1922 preface by declaring: "Even the most original talent cannot proceed beyond certain limits which are fixed for it by the dates of its birth. Not everything is possible at all times, and certain thoughts can only be thought at certain stages of the development."[19] While many reject the sweeping historicism of this declaration, a number of film scholars – including, as we shall see, David Bordwell – have found convincing the idea that artists face constraints that depend on their birthdates (or, perhaps more accurately, the times they began working). One possible way of conceptualizing this, clearly relevant to the project of a "film history without names," is George Kubler's *series* concept.

George Kubler and the Concept of Series

Yale art historian George Kubler proposed his series concept in a small but dense book called *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*.[20] Published in 1962, at a time when a number of highly important art-historical publications on style and its history and psychology were appearing, the book argues that "the idea of art can be expanded to embrace the whole range of man-made things, including all tools and writing in addition to the useless, beautiful, and poetic things of the world."[21] Kubler, who was born in 1912 and died in 1996, was a student of Henri Focillon and the English translator of his book *The Life of Forms in Art*.[22] The bulk of his work as an art historian was devoted to the art and architecture of ancient America.
In *The Shape of Time*, Kubler emphasized the purposiveness of man-made things and rejected the kind of biological metaphors found in a great deal of earlier art history, including that of Focillon. He writes: "Purpose has no place in biology, but history has no meaning without it."[23] Kubler embraces a problem-solution-model, writing that "the principal aim of history" has usually been "to identify and reconstruct the particular problem to which any action or thing must correspond as a solution. Sometimes the problem is a rational one, and

sometimes it is an artistic one: we always may be sure that every man-made thing arises from a problem as a purposeful solution."[24]

The distinction Kubler draws here between rational problems and artistic problems is significant. He rejects all use-oriented positions that would see artifacts solely in terms of practical, social, or political function. He writes:

> *Artistic inventions alter the sensibility of mankind. They all emerge from and return to human perception, unlike useful inventions, which are keyed to the physical and biological environment. Useful inventions alter mankind only indirectly by altering his environment; aesthetic inventions enlarge human awareness directly with new ways of experiencing the universe, rather than with new objective interpretations.*[25]

The arts, then, comprise an autonomous realm, at least in part: the problems artists deal with are often problems set by the arts themselves. In the realm of cinema, film-makers frequently make choices about cinematic devices – framing, lighting, camera movement, editing – for purely aesthetic reason. Solutions to the same or related problems can, argues Kubler, be fruitfully arranged in *sequences* or *series*.

Kubler explicitly borrows these terms from mathematics.[26] A sequence in mathematics is a function. The Fibonacci sequence is an example particularly well-known in pop culture; it appears in *The Da Vinci Code*, in Darren Aronofsky's π, and elsewhere. For each number, each place in the sequence, there is a Fibonacci number, which is the sum of the previous two Fibonacci numbers. The sequence extends to infinity. A series, on the other hand, ends at some point.

Kubler's idea is that artifacts can be arranged in sequences (which are ongoing) or series (which have ended). From the point of view of the artist, the work takes its place in a sequence, because others may continue in the same tradition. The historian, on the other hand, is often faced with traditions that have exhausted themselves or been abandoned for other reasons: red figure vases, for instance, is a closed series; silent films perhaps as well.

David Summers, who was Kubler's pupil,[27] discusses the series concept in *Real Spaces* and uses a pair of flint projectile points (it is hard to know if they were attached to spears or arrows) as one of his examples. One is from Europe, the other from America. Both are carefully crafted and fully adequate to their purpose. The differences between them – squarish corners in one, a rounded back in the other – make no known functional difference, but they recur in the many similar points found in the two locations. In Kubler's sense, they belong to different series because they are geographically and historically completely separate from each other, even if they are solutions to the same practical problem of crafting a sharp, sleek, symmetrical point from flint: "Historically only those solutions related to one another by the bonds of tradition and influence are linked as a sequence," Kubler writes.[28]

The series concept gives considerable importance to the first artifact in the series, the *prime object*, as Kubler calls it.[29] In the case of the spear points, we must assume that the first American to make one decided to make it with a rounded rear, and that became the way a spear point was supposed to look. More generally, the later artifacts in a series are constrained by the choices made by the makers of the earlier ones. Art historian Whitney Davis, who draws on Kubler in his ambitious book *A General Theory of Visual Culture*, summarizes this rule as follows: "In an irreversible finite series, taking one position defines and reduces the formal motions that are possible in succeeding positions."[30]

If artifacts are organized in series on the basis of being "linked solutions" to a particular problem, as Kubler proposes,[31] the position of an artifact in a sequence affects the kinds of options available to its maker. While Kubler rejects terms like "primitive," "classical," and "decadent" because of their strongly evaluative connotations, he insists that it makes a great deal of difference to be either an early or a late position in a sequence, what he calls "the *systematic age* of each item in a formal series according to its position in the duration."[32] He even proposes using the biological terms "promorph" for early form and "neomorph" for late form. He describes the differences as follows:

> *Early solutions (promorphic) are technically simple, energetically inexpensive, expressively clear. Late solutions (neomorphic) are costly, difficult, intricate, recondite, and animated. Early solutions are integral in relation to the problem they resolve. Late ones are partial in being addressed more to the details of function or expression than to the totality of the same problem.*[33]

This concept of "systematic age" can help explain how belonging to a particular age cohort will give artists a particular set of options, and simply being born at the opportune moment may allow them to excel in a way denied to those right before or after them. Kubler writes: "To the usual coordinates fixing the individual's position – his temperament and his training – there is also the moment of his *entrance*, this being the moment in the tradition – early, middle, or late – with which his biological opportunity coincides. [...] Without a good entrance, he is in danger of wasting his time as a copyist regardless of temperament and training."[34]
Obviously, Kubler here attempts to accommodate Wölfflin's previously-quoted claim that artists' opportunities are "fixed" by their birth dates, and that "Not everything is possible at all times," but without positing any nebulous metaphysical forces. David Bordwell, too, has argued that the moment of entrance matters. In the important essay "The Dreyer Generation," he writes:

> *Curtiz and Murnau were born in 1888; Lang, Delluc, and L'Herbier were born in 1890. Gance, Chaplin, and Dreyer were exact contemporaries, all born in 1889. I'm not casting runes here. My point is that many directors debuting in the 1910s were young enough to have a fresh perspective on this new medium. They were the first "movie generation," with films forming part of their childhood and adolescent experience.*[35]

To Bordwell, belonging to a different age cohort may therefore mean having "different creative opportunities and choices."[36]
The series concept, all told, is a nicely middle-level one that places the individual artist within clear contextual constraints, yet does not need uniform epochs or large supra-individual historical forces. Kubler puts it this way:

> *Simple biographical narration in the history of art tends to display the entire historical situation in terms of an individual's development. Such biography is a necessary stage of reconstruction, but a formal sequence designates chains of linked events by an analysis, which requires us to do the opposite: to perceive the individual in terms of his situation. Sequence classing allows us to bridge the gap between biography and the history of style with a conception less protean than biological or dialectic theories of the dynamics of style, and more powerfully descriptive than biography.*[37]

Kubler also explicitly allows for sequences that include works in different media:

> *The linked series of solutions composing a sequence is not necessarily restricted to a single craft.* [...] *An example is afforded by the abrupt contrasts of light and shadow in seventeenth-century chiaroscuro composition, allowing novel illusions of depth and movement. This new organization of the surfaces rapidly spread throughout all the visual arts.*[38]

This meshes well with the conception of a "transmediality of forms" invoked in the original description of the Film History without Names project.

Serialization and its Discontents

An important drawback of the series concept in a film studies context is that it may mean too many other things already. Apart from the most common everyday use, where we speak of film series and tv series like the *Harry Potter* films and *The Sopranos*, the most prominent use of series concepts in film studies may be André Gaudreault's term "*série culturelle.*" In the 1997 article where he first proposed the concept, he said that he preferred this term over "cultural practice" or "signifying practice," "particularly because of the semantic field the word 'series' opens up."[39] In a working paper from 2013, Frank Kessler has sought to tease out some

of these, noting the uses of the word "series" in Foucault, in Michèle Lagny and French historiography, and in Russian formalist criticism.[40] It is interesting that Gaudreault should be using the term in a sense that at least seems related to Kubler's. Gaudreault has not drawn on Kubler, nor, it would seem, did his acknowledged inspiration, the Canadian semiotician Louis Francoeur.[41] Arguably, they belong to different historical series. Even so, a comparison is in order.

An obvious difference is that what Kubler organizes in series and sequences are *things*, physical objects, artifacts – or rather details about them: particular techniques or devices, since whole objects are "extremely complicated entities," a complexity that Kubler reckons we must simply accept: "Once their difficulty is conceded, it is possible to find aspects that can be used in comparisons. No such trait now known is unitary or fundamental: every trait of a thing is both a cluster of subordinate traits as well as a subordinate part of another cluster."[42] And again: "Our interest therefore centers upon minute portions of things rather than upon the whole mosaic of traits that constitutes any object."[43] Gaudreault and his collaborator Philippe Marion, on the other hand, seem interested in using the series concept at a much less detailed level. They compare "kino-attractography" (a term Gaudreault argues should replace "early cinema") with "institutional cinema" (most commercial moviemaking since 1910 or so) and identify these very broad groupings as cultural series.[44]

Another difference involves change over time. Kubler developed his model for the purpose of studying ancient American art, where we have no names or any other information about the artists. It was intended as an alternative to the interpretive models favored by the archaeologists who dominated the study of pre-Columbian artifacts. Their models tended to describe all artifacts from a particular period as reflective of the character of the period. Instead, the concept of series favors a more diachronic, longitudinal approach, where artists respond to the solutions of those who have worked on the same problem before them, rather than some vague period character. Kubler's series allow us to see continuities across periods. While Gaudreault's concept of *série culturelle* can be used to bring into focus the continuities between "kino-attractography" and other attraction-entertainments of the same years, its main argumentative purpose seems to be to stress the rupture and the difference between "kino-attractography" on the one hand and "institutional cinema" on the other, thereby defamiliarizing the courses of events usually recounted as a single, continuous "history of film."

The real difference, however, is not necessarily about levels of comparison – arguably, some of the examples of series mentioned by Kubler approach the same level of generality as some the cultural series identified by Gaudreault and Marion: "red-figure vases" as compared to "the *féerie*," for instance.[45] Rather, the important difference lies in the historical existence and efficacy claimed for the two kinds of series. Gaudreault and Marion describe their cultural series as organizing devices imposed by later scholarship: "The concept 'cultural series' [...] supposes that the scholar has divided up the object of study and taken on the task of constructing story events, factual events and cultural series, whose ties to each other he or she then undertakes to explain."[46] To Kubler, on the other hand, the "systematic age" of an artifact with respect to a particular series is a historical fact, not a subsequent scholarly construction. Accordingly, any use of series concepts would have to clarify the explanatory reach claimed for them.

Further conceptual confusions, besides those potentially produced by the various series concepts discussed by Frank Kessler in his examination of Gaudreault's, may arise from the mathematical metaphor underlying the use of the terms "series" and "sequence" (Kessler does not discuss mathematics). I think that it is hard to be sure what weight one should give to the subsidiary implications of the metaphor. At the very least, the metaphor appears to hold out a promise of a more strictly linear arrangement of artifacts than I think is either feasible or reasonable. I cannot claim to have any command of advanced algebra, but I do think that the record of humanists borrowing technical terms from higher mathematics or physics shows that it rarely leads to conceptual clarification and all too often to confusion.

While the manifold meanings of "series" may be the concept's biggest drawback, there are also specific issues with Kubler's conception. It gives relative primacy to an initial solution, what Kubler calls a "prime work": being the first to identify and take on a problem becomes particularly significant, as the conclusion to *The Shape of Time* underscores: "In place of the idea of style, which embraces too many associations, these pages have outlined the idea of a linked succession of prime works with replications, all being distributed in time

as recognizably early and late versions of the same kind of action."[47] In the classic essay "A Theory of Style," first published in 1962, the art and architecture historian James S. Ackerman (like Kubler, a pupil of Focillon) voiced the basic objection is that no artistic problem stays the same. He writes:

> *What is called "evolution" in the arts should not be described as a succession of steps toward a solution to a given problem, but as a succession of steps away from one or more original statements of a problem.* [...] *So we cannot speak properly of a sequence of solutions to a given problem, since with each solution the problem changes.*[48]

I do think that the differences here can probably be resolved. Kubler certainly allows that problems become modified by previous solutions: "The classes we are considering contain events related as progressive solutions to problems of which the requirements are modified by each successive solution."[49] In one sense, the problem does change, because previous solutions must be taken into account; in another sense, the original problem remains, since the new solutions are still felt to apply. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why some artists arrive at points that produce a feeling of *belatedness*, where all the interesting problems have been solved and the opportunities for originality are much reduced.[50] Such feelings would imply that everything is not always new.

If we agree with the idea that systematic age is something real, we should have some way of talking about it. Kubler's series concept seems useful for that purpose. In order to avoid further confusions and to distinguish it from Gaudreault's "cultural series," we will probably need to add a qualifier. "Artifact series" is one possibility, but as we have seen, artifacts like films are too complex to be ordered in series; only certain aspects of them – perhaps genre, lighting, or editing patterns – could be ordered this way. Another option is "stylistic series," but that would go against Kubler's determination to *replace* the idea of style. "Solution series" is probably the best option: it makes clear exactly what it is that is being arranged in sequence, and it aligns the concept with the problem-solution model, which is well established in film studies and has proven its usefulness.

Notes

1 David Bordwell, "Textual Analysis, Etc.," in *Enclitic*, vol. 5/6, no. 2/1, Fall/Spring 1982, p. 130.
2 Cf. Arnold Hauser, *The Philosophy of Art History* (*Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte*, Beck, München 1958), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1959, pp. 117-276.
3 Cf. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst* [1915], Bruckmann, München 1917, p. VII.
4 Cf. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art* (*Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst,* Bruckmann, München 1915), Dover, New York 1950.
5 Heinrich Wölfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst*, cit., p. VII.
6 Rens Bod, *A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from Antiquity to the Present*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, p. 316.
7 Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art*, cit., p. VIII.
8 Arnold Hauser, *The Philosophy of Art History*, cit., pp. 121-22.
9 *Idem*, pp. 137-38.
10 David Bordwell, "Wölfflin and Film Style: Some Thoughts on a Poetics of Pictures," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 73, no. 2, 2015, p. 187. See also his "An Excursus on Reflections and Zeitgeists," in David Bordwell, *Poetics of Cinema*, Routledge, New York 2008, pp. 30-32.
11 David Bordwell, "Wölfflin and Film Style: Some Thoughts on a Poetics of Pictures," cit., p. 178.
12 David Summers, *Real Spaces: World Art History and the Rise of Western Modernism*, Phaidon, London 2003, p. 27.
13 *Idem*, p. 61.

[14] David Bordwell, "Wölfflin and Film Style: Some Thoughts on a Poetics of Pictures," cit., p. 186, quoting Ernst Gombrich and Didier Eribon, *Looking for Answers: Conversations on Art and Science*, Abrams, New York 1993, p. 168.
[15] Cf. Ernst H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, Phaidon, London 1960.
[16] Cf. Colin Burnett, "A New Look at the Concept of Style in Film: The Origins and Development of the Problem–Solution Model," in *New Review of Film and Television Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2, August 2008, pp. 127-49.
[17] *Idem*, p. 131.
[18] *Idem*, p. 132.
[19] Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art*, cit., p. IX.
[20] Cf. George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1962.
[21] *Idem*, p. 1.
[22] Cf. Henri Focillon, *The Life of Forms in Art* (*Vie des formes*, Leroux, Paris 1934), Zone Books, New York 1989.
[23] George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., p. 8.
[24] *Ibidem.*
[25] Cf. *idem*, p. 65.
[26] Cf. *idem*, pp. 33-34.
[27] Cf. David Summers, "Regarding Art and Art History," in *Art Bulletin*, vol. 95, no. 3, 2013.
[28] George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., p. 33.
[29] Cf. *idem*, p. 39.
[30] Whitney Davis, "World Series," in *Third Text*, vol. 25, no. 5, 2011, p. 496; see also Whitney Davis, *A General Theory of Visual Culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011, pp. 296-97.
[31] Cf. George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., p. 33.
[32] *Idem*, p. 55.
[33] *Idem*, pp. 55-56.
[34] *Idem*, p. 6.
[35] David Bordwell, "The Dreyer Generation," 2010, http://english.carlthdreyer.dk/About-Dreyer/Visual-style/The-Dreyer-Generation.aspx; last visit June 26th, 2015.
[36] *Idem.*
[37] George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., pp. 35-36.
[38] *Idem*, p. 49.
[39] André Gaudreault, *Les* Vues cinématographiques *selon Georges Méliès ou: comment Mitry et Sadoul avaient peut-être raison d'avoir tort (même si c'est surtout Deslandes qu'il faut lire et relire)...*, in Jacques Malthête and Michel Marie (eds.), *Georges Mélies, l'illusionniste fin de siècle?*, Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris 1997, p. 121 (note 21) (my translation).
[40] Cf. Frank Kessler, "Notes on the Concept of 'Cultural Series'," http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/290013/Notes+on+the+Concept+of+Cultural+Series.pdf?sequence=1; last visit June 26th, 2015.
[41] Cf. André Gaudreault, personal communication, March 19th, 2015.
[42] George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., pp. 35-36.
[43] *Idem*, pp. 40-41.
[44] See André Gaudreault, *Film and Attraction: From Kinematography to Cinema* (*Cinéma et attraction: pour une nouvelle histoire du cinématographe*, CNRS, Paris 2008), University of Illinois Press, Urbana 2011; André Gaudreault, Philippe Marion, "The Mysterious Affair of Styles in the Age of Kine-Attractography," in *Early Popular Visual Culture*, vol. 8, no. 1, February 2010; André Gaudreault, Philippe Marion, *The Kinematic Turn: Film in the Digital Era and Its Ten Problems*, Caboose, Montréal 2012; André Gaudreault, Philippe Marion, *La Fin du cinéma?: un média en crise à l'ère du numérique*, Colin, Paris 2013.
[45] Cf. George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., p. 48, pp. 118-20; André Gaudreault, Philippe Marion, *La Fin du cinéma?: un média en crise à l'ère du numérique* [e-book version], cit., loc. 5515.
[46] André Gaudreault, Philippe Marion, *The Kinematic Turn: Film in the Digital Era and Its Ten Problems*, cit., p. 10.

[47] *Idem*, p. 130.
[48] James S. Ackerman, "A Theory of Style," in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1962, p. 232.
[49] George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, cit., pp. 96-97.
[50] See, for instance, David Bordwell, *The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern Movies*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 2006, pp. 23-26.